

the agreement of agreement (*l'accord d'accord*)

Guy Le Gaufey¹

(What follows is a plea for a certain style of *passee* which is practised in the *École Lacanienne de Psychanalyse*, in order to continue this adventure, in so far as it is precariously inscribed in regard to the demands for legitimacy within prevailing discourses.)

It is possible that the most disastrous idea regarding the *passee* is the one that occurs in the very simple distinction, enunciated soon after it was set up, according to which, in the first place, a type of event would occur during a psychoanalytic treatment such that, in a second moment, there would be an appeal to a special procedure – the very one that Jacques Lacan invented from beginning to end in his *Proposition of October 1967* – in order that we might come to know something about it.

This type of consideration, seemingly trivial to the point that it might seem imposed by simple common sense, is nonetheless imbued with the nobility – and the power of intimidation – of the Platonic conception of numbers: they exist by themselves in the celestial purity of the Ideas and mathematicians strive to discover their properties by yielding to the rigours of demonstration. Thus their knowledge is nothing but the map of a country that is already there and which existed well before intrepid adventurers explore it. They bring back for us some attempted sketches, imperfect by nature since they are only scale drawings, woven within the narrow world of our letters and their combinations, of a reality that finds its consistency by itself, without expecting us to turn our attention to it in order to solidify some outline or other from it.

The essentials of classical physics were very well reconciled to this conception which turns a mathematical tool into a descriptive instrument of physical reality, and which found in Kant's transcendental aesthetics the philosophical framework that it had lacked. This aesthetics, on the other hand, which had broken through in a powerful but unreasoned manner at the cusp of the 16th and 17th centuries, provided the concept of representation with all that was necessary in order to henceforth appear incontrovertible.

And what was bound to happen, happened: the *passee* fell into the rut of representation. If not all, then many of those who approached it, from near or from far (or who dreamed of approaching it, from near or from far), thus became stuck on the idea of an event occurring during the very course of the treatment, by which an analysand would 'pass' into an analyst, and would change position (or would be on the point of changing). Something specific would take place at that spot which had not been located until that moment. And Lacan, in his theoretical profusion, would seem to have provided the tongs to grasp it. Who would dare to say the opposite? In truth, no-one. It is out of the question to demonstrate that the Platonic conception of numbers is wrong, and it would be futile to maintain that a representation is without an object (starting from the fact that it is not self-contradictory) – since no point of view allows an object to be compared to its representation.

But one might want to place oneself in another system of thought as soon as one becomes aware of the narrowness of a conception of language and of various symbolic systems according to which they are only ever used to *transcribe* something that has its true place

elsewhere, that is, outside of the writing or speech that would be restricted to re-presenting it to our understanding, most often with the aim of transmitting it through conceptual means or to proceed to some calculations.

Even if, in many ways, this *Proposition* can also be read as a theoretically elaborated description of the event by which an analyst might come into being, it nonetheless takes the risk of enunciating a *new principle* called to intervene upon a point which had already been univocally settled amongst the whole of the Freudian diaspora: *each analyst must have been analysed*. From the very beginnings of the IPA, Ferenczi made this the ‘second fundamental rule,’ an expression that is taken, alas, very lightly.

The first rule, the one that we are happy to call ‘the’ fundamental rule without even needing to say that it is the first one, determines a language game that by agreement is called ‘psychoanalysis’, and that a vast community that is today dispersed, continues to hold as pertinent. It invites the patient to say ‘what comes to mind,’ and the analyst who enunciates and supports it consequently makes himself the first dupe of this game of chance, and endeavours to favour it being kept to, respecting, in short (at least one hopes so!), this rule that he has decreed. But how does he respect the second rule?

By creating the word ‘analysand²,’ Lacan gave himself the means to *pose* the question: how does one pass from ‘analysand’ (present participle) to ‘analysed’ (past participle)? How can we know if an analysis has come to the point of having produced an ‘analysed’? Since this term is adopted as that upon which the Freudian community models itself, well beyond differences of opinion, it becomes necessary to know what *game* one plays when one adopts this ‘second fundamental rule’.

A rule, by definition, never stands alone, nor is it valid for one person alone. It functions by being articulated, in a manner which is itself regulated, to other rules and for a multiplicity of players, thus generating what we can call a ‘game,’ at least if we understand by this a normative set, which, like the grammar³ of a natural language, leaves the members of the community who practise it with a choice, at almost any moment, between innumerable variants.

The text of 1967 brings a supplementary *proposition* to the place of the second fundamental rule and the history of its being put into play illustrates how well-founded this title is. Lacan, “as alone [as he] always was in [his] relation to the analytic cause”⁴, could have used his authority to add this new covenant to the foundational texts of the *École Freudienne de Paris*, which he had already written by his hand alone. He did nothing of the sort but rather put this *Proposition* to the vote of the members of his young school, placing himself in the position of requiring their agreement. Not only was it necessary, to play that particular game, for there to be several people, but first of all these people had to agree upon the fact, in this regard to this, that henceforth there would be a regulated possibility of agreement.

This detail – the preliminary agreement upon the modality of the agreement to come, which gives a rule its foundation – had not escaped the Wittgenstein of the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* as Christiane Chauviré⁵ emphasizes: “The agreement on the agreement is a presupposition of the language games of mathematics”. Without this first movement of an agreement on the agreement, no rule as such can be valid, unless by a violence imposed by force or wile.

Up until that time, attaining of the title of analyst presupposed much more than the 'second fundamental rule' alone. For it to be effective there had to be an implementation of a third agent that decided many things. On the one hand that the analysand had to have truly become an 'analysed' [*analysé*], in that he had finished with his training analysis (i.e. undergone with a training analyst), and that furthermore he was fit to become a psychoanalyst, a decision made by an *ad hoc* committee at the level of a discreet 'admittance assessment'. This way of doing things instituted, outside the couch/armchair relation, an authority capable of deciding what psychoanalysis is and what it is not, thus an authority in which an authorized psychoanalyst already exists, ready for use, supported in the first instance by his or her analytic pedigree. This is exactly the solution that Freud advocated in his *Lay Analysis* to separate the wheat from the chaff. Where the State was disqualified, the Institutes like that of Berlin, with its breeding-ground of training analysts, carried all the hopes for the future. Half a century later such an expectation was no longer tenable for Lacan, because, amongst other reasons, his 'ex-communication' of 1963 boiled down to the fact of being excluded... from the list of training analysts, which he had already had a jibe at in his paper "Situation of psychoanalysis in 1956". He could no longer, without contradiction, take support from it in his school following the break from the IPA, with this same countenance of the training analyst, variously determined by an identification with Freud who alone escaped, by pure genealogical principle, from the second fundamental rule (with a type of *Totem and Taboo* reasoning as its only legitimate support).

The *proposition* put forward by Lacan favours a point of view within clinical practice and it does not allow any *deus ex machina* from outside of the fundamental rule to intervene. This, on the other hand, establishes nothing other than the couch/armchair setting and the social bond that is woven there. This proposition, articulated directly with the second fundamental rule of which it constitutes a counterpoint, states the following: 'the game, which commences with the establishment of a transference⁶, possesses an intrinsic end'.

What is intended by such a statement remains to be seen. The *passant*, in other words he or she who presents him or herself to the game *that is offered as a possibility*, in the first instance seems to be the object of the majority of the text. If we have eyes only for this textual prevalence of the *passant* and what is supposed to happen to him or her, if we think that the procedure is only a clever means to allow the attainment of a common representation of the intimate aspect of the bend taken towards analyst by the analysand, then the realistic and platonic illusion by virtue of which this moment exists in and of itself will undividedly triumph. But if we understand by this statement the setting out of a rule, proposed as such for the agreement by a certain number of people, we can at once locate the appearance of two other types of players who are rather discreet in the initial text. Now that the *passee* has been implemented in various ways for more than forty years, these other types of players have had a fair bit written about them: I named the *passeur* and the analyst who designates him, who I shall not rush to refer to as *nommant*⁷ as is the practice in the *École Lacanienne de Psychanalyse*, given the various means of doing things in regard to this over the years and across different schools.

We might think that this analyst who designates must have understood the meaning of the proposition even before having put it into practice, since he is given the task of designating a *passeur* in so far as the latter would be, unknowingly, already in the moment of the *passee*. And his own part does not stop there since his fate awaits him, he and others amongst his peers who had committed the same act of designation, in order to form a jury and hear, at the crossroads of testimonies produced by the *passeurs*, that which might have passed from the saying of the *passant*, in order to give a ruling upon the outcome of a *passee*.

In presenting things in this way, we can better guess that with his “Proposition”⁸, for Lacan it was a question of bringing others *to stake a wager like him*, by taking the risk of designating *passeurs*, in other words by supporting in act (and not just in opinion) the hypothesis of an intrinsic end to the transference game. One of the stakes was there, and there it remains.

Why would one want to consider such an end? There is no lack of examples in the psychoanalytic literature, and even the most recent, of stating, in a realistic tone when it is not sarcastic or sardonic, that transference is interminable. And Freud, in his reference work on the topic did not hesitate to advise the analyst to take up another stretch of analysis every five years. How could we conceive of things otherwise?

I am not putting this question to Jacques Lacan. I give him credit for having said all that he could, both within the *Proposition* as well as outside of it. And as cryptic as his text appears, I am not seeking here to sound out his reasoning. I am not attempting to make something out of the question that he addressed to the members of his school as it was in 1967, and which is still just as topical for anyone who considers himself, some day, to be in a position of naming a *passeur*: why put one’s wager on the possibility of an intrinsic end to the transference?

The scope of the psychological answers intimidates us and prompts us to return to the word ‘rule’ that was introduced above. He or she who plays a game or puts a rule into practice, only does so since he or she has a taste for it, and this proximity results from the accident of an encounter, or from the slow maturation within a network that is already oriented towards such an end, towards such an ‘agreement on an agreement’ which, however nourished it is by opinion, only exists as act.

The designation of the *passeur* strives to *pose the problem* of “what happens in regard to the transference relation”⁹ by giving oneself the means of opening it up to a minimal and temporary community whose existence is given only by the question that it has made its own. Consequently, between the one and the other, there is a veritable circularity since the support that they mutually lend each other does not allow a first element to be determined through it.

The absence, so often repeated, of public ‘criteria’ – whether it is at the level of the designation of the *passeurs* or the deliberations of the juries – holds completely to this fundamental circularity in the function of the *passee*. One can endeavour to take support from such criteria when one is an authority called upon to judge all comers with whom one is not merged. In such a case the judging party must have some means to which the party being judged does not have access – this imbalance is essential (with the whole game of hide-and-seek inferred by it). Moreover, by itself, a criterion does nothing; in order to function it requires a responsible agent, an agent that a legitimate authority has to appoint and establish through its ability to implement the criterion. There is no implementation of criteria without the establishment of a legitimate power that is able to name agents.

Those who designate the *passeurs*, quite the contrary to this hierarchical approach, might possibly find themselves in the position of all or part of a jury of the *passee*, in which they are in the position of responding to the question that they put to themselves and *put* at the time of their act of designating a *passeur*. By virtue of this fact they are inscribed in a circle that excludes the possibility of founding the matter according to one or more pre-established criteria (unless we suppose once again that they already had the answer at the moment of the designation).

Henceforth, the questioning that had ruled over this designation is no longer enunciated in a solitary consciousness, but rather in a game of many: are there ‘necessary accidents’¹⁰, in the enactment of a transference that modify its nature and precipitate an end? He who accepts to become the object of this transference cannot be the sole judge of the matter, and it is there that the question of the production of a third is so clearly posed, a third who, rather than overseeing the rule from the vantage point of some authority, power or legitimacy or other, simply accepts to put it into play.

The *passseur*, who is appointed by a designation that is not self-evident, comes into play here. The debates that were fuelled by the notion of the *passseur* under the name of ‘non-analyst’ are well known. Those who were to found the Fourth group refused this element. And this is also the key point of resistance to the *passse* more or less everywhere today. Why would someone in the position of analysand accept to be thrust by his or her analyst into something other than the pursuit of his or her own treatment?

It is not easy to know if it is a question of some ‘other thing’ or not. By placing an analysand in the position of *passseur*, the analyst puts the transference to the test in a way that is partly able to be located: the *passseur* here is an instrument – a term that gets a bad press these days through the success of the dark verb ‘to instrumentalize’¹¹, but which, in its etymology, initially designated something that was employed, or even manufactured, in order to *instruct* something. This *passseur* is produced as an instrument in order to put another rule into play, more conspicuous than the previous one, announced in the following way: ‘The analyst is authorized only from himself’. This is not a technical recommendation, nor is it a superegoic bogeyman, but a requirement that situates the transference in what I thought was best called its ‘target’¹², this ‘himself’ negatively designating the absence of any ultimate authority. This is what the analyst who designates a *passseur* undertakes to put to the test by opening up the possibility that an analysand accepts to become the instrument in this matter, a matter that concerns him or her closely – this is at least an essential presupposition.

This *passseur* is then in the position of third, not just between the *passant* and the jury, where it is obvious, but in so far as he is also left to ‘himself’ of which he has begun to gain some idea (this is the wager). As soon as he accepts this transitory position, the two rules enunciated as such previously: ‘there is an intrinsic end to the transference’ and ‘the analyst authorizes himself only from himself’ can come into play, to lead on to a game – as long as a *passant* takes the risk, and makes the opening move.

A rule does not endeavour to describe a reality but to shape our means of representation at that point. It is not so much a question of *verifying* if such a case corresponds to our statements, but to appreciate its pertinence *since it is thanks to them that the case presented itself*. Once again there is a circularity, no longer in the people, but rather between the facts and the instruments by which these facts are grasped: each of the three actors – the one who designates the *passseur*, the *passant*, and the *passseur* – can play according to rules in his own way, but the ‘agreement on the agreement’ now urges them on towards a common outcome. Wittgenstein forcefully expressed this: “By multiplying [in applying a rule], I hasten towards an encounter that is common to all”.¹³

The facts – in other words the *said*s [*dits*] – that the *passseur* transmits to the jury carry the mark of a triple workmanship. In them at different times can be read: the traces of the designation of the *passseur*, the perspectives of his position as instrument, and all of this on the background of the *passant*’s account. A *passse* can thus fail in many places without it always being possible to pinpoint exactly where: jury, *passseurs*, *passant*, designator of the *passseur*,

each and every one can miss the appointment they have in common, an appointment established by the deliberated game of the rules, and overturn the whole enterprise.

This encounter nonetheless gives rise to a community, one which put the rules above into play with the following central heterogeneity: certain amongst them are present as a given (*passant*, designator of the *passeur*), the others are appointed (*passeur*). If we stop there, it would nevertheless seem that this community only gathers together its actual actors. However, the nature of a rule is such that it gives rise to a public that functions as a breeding ground for its potential actors. In so far as it arises from an agreement on an agreement, the rule is effectively fed by a certain temporal thickness: one agrees... on the eventuality of a future agreement. Every rule is thus laden with the future of its applications without which it is nothing but a sterile statement, the same as an unuttered performative. Thus an audience is forged, a public for whom the rule is valid in the expectation of its enactment, and whence its future actors will arise. This is as true of the *passee* as it is of mathematics or of bullfighting.

If the *passee*, in as much as it is a rule, only requires two types of actors (since the first – the designator of the *passeur* – produces *ipso facto* a third term), from where can they be unearthed? The public needed by the *passee*, amongst whom it finds those who will put it into action, is composed on the one hand by analysts who are variously caught up in the outcome of the transferences of which they allow themselves to be the supports, and thereby open to the question of designating *passeurs*; on the other hand the potential *passants*, the latter given over to the squaring of the circle that the ‘to authorize oneself’ establishes. The *passee* draws its consistency by virtue of the fact of this double register, and it is thanks to this differential that that which carries the beautiful name of ‘recognition’ is woven.

For it to be heard in its own register, which is that of the psychoanalyst, it is important to differentiate its various forms. We have already touched upon the question of the criteria. It can happen that a duly authorized body has an explicit or secret criterion that allows it to distinguish between the candidates who have the right to the sought-after title, and those who are not at that point. I am proposing that the type of procedure could be called a test of *qualification*. The presence of the required criteria justifies the public recognition of a *quality*, as is clearly the case for diplomas, whether university ones or others.

It can also happen that the criteria are lacking, deliberately or not, for the deciding body, and then, since I no longer know against what I should judge what is presented, I compare it to my own person. This is referred to as *co-optation*: I accept you in so far as you are like me in regard to such and such a trait, and I give you public recognition of this; you and I have something in common. This is the natural ingredient of groups.

If the *passee* were to come down to one or other of these forms of recognition, we would no longer understand the reason for such an overly involved procedure. Hence it is better to venture towards the idea of a recognition coming from a body that *neither qualifies nor co-opts*, to the extent that it is almost as lacking in recognition as he who expressly demands it: it will only be recognized in so far as it is brought to recognize. It holds its power from an act to come, and not a mandate from elsewhere. This body has no superiority over the *passant*, since, without the latter it would not exist (*pratique du tourbillon*¹⁴). Moreover, its heterotopical composition – in that the designators of the *passeurs* rub shoulders with one *passeur*, drawn by lot, referred to as ‘*passeur* of the jury’ – gives it an identity that rests only upon the answer that it will give in act, not upon the homogeneity of its composition.

This transitory identity of the jury, tied to its function and not to its composition, is informed – via the *passeurs* – by a *passant* caught up in the swinging movement that is particular to any true demand of recognition: a demand for the recognition of what is already there, for an enactment of what has already occurred, and at the same time a demand, through this recognition, that even that which was not there, up to that point, comes to be. A tension between an identity that is outlined – but by being carved out, in the opacity of a presence diffracted by the indirect testimony of the *passeurs* – and an identity on the way (*en passe*) to becoming, but later, by the assent that comes from the jury. We might divine in this movement a return of the assumption that Lacan did not cease to specify regarding his mirror stage: he who does not know himself suddenly recognizes himself in that which is there, held out to him. And contrary to qualification and to co-optation, this mode of recognition forever carries the mark of a *missed encounter*.

This oxymoron, as a central notion in Lacan, emerges in a poetic and lyrical vein at the time of his commentary on the famous dream “Father, don’t you see I’m burning?”¹⁵, to celebrate the impossible encounter between a living father and his dead son. The story of this dream is in itself rich in lessons in regard to the *passe*. Not only is it not a dream of Freud’s, but it is not even second hand for him: “It was told to me by a woman patient who had herself heard it in a lecture on dreams: its actual source is still unknown to me”.¹⁶ Thus we do not have any associations from the dreamer, no day’s residue, nothing that might have allowed the dream to be brought back to its signifying production. By judging this dream “quite particularly transparent”¹⁷, Freud invites us to swallow both the story and its factual reality hook, line and sinker – a father lost his son, kept a vigil over him, then fell asleep in the adjoining room, leaving him surrounded by candles and watched over by an old man, who fell asleep himself, etc. – then the dream – the son, who arose, despite being dead, came up to the father and whispered to him, reproachfully: “Father, don’t you see I’m burning” – without us even knowing if this dream were not a dream within the dream, if all of this situation is not the fruit of a one and only dream in which the sudden awakening of the father might itself have been dreamed, leaving the dreamer to peacefully continue his sleep...

We will never know anything about all that, nor Lacan who nonetheless takes advantage of the fact that Freud makes something out of the dream in order for him to see it as a “truly unique encounter” that allows him to pose the question regarding “what is correlative, in the dream, of the representation. This question is all the more striking in that, here, we see the dream really as the counterpart (*envers*) of the representation”. As a result, the imaginary violence of this impossible father/son encounter allows him here to grab onto, right in the thick of Freudian territory, that which he holds closest to his heart: the real in as much as it evades any representation and nonetheless constitutes that which magnetizes the most invested ones. This very curious ‘reverse side (*envers*) of representation’ permits him to evoke, thanks to his poetic vein, a ‘beyond of representation’ that deserves the name of ‘real’. It follows that any encounter with such a real is in no way conceivable, since, according to Lacan, one only encounters some representations conceived like “the screen that conceals something quite primary, something determinant in the function of repetition...”.¹⁸ The missed encounter henceforth deserves its qualifier in so far as it is said to miss a real that is, nonetheless, by virtue of this failure, to become specified and even in part localized. This is why I hold it to be central in the type of recognition that the device of the *passe* attempts to produce. Neither qualification nor co-optation, the missed encounter circumscribes, as closely as possible for a concept, that which will be repeated in the position of analyst which has come to be declared through it. The oxymoron that strove, in one single act of speech, to

speak of a positive fact (the encounter) and its negation (the miss) serves to designate a border, something strange which only has one side, a type of littoral.

I evoked the story that is so uncertain, in Freud as much as in Lacan, of this pilot dream, in order to better establish to what degree the existence of a border implies a singular movement with those who assert it as such. A border does not offer itself to us: it only leaves itself to be divined by whoever seeks to go beyond it. Outside of this blind and adventurous effort to stride across it and to which it is an obstacle, the border remains silent. It has little to say. This muteness suits it and takes hold of whoever might seek to invade it, since it is nothing more than that which effects a fork in a path. Whoever might want to make a positivity out of it will see the thing escape from him according to the degree of his efforts. Whence this heavy atmosphere that surrounds the *passee*-as-it-is-spoken-of: false mysteries and true secrets, infernal machine full of emptiness, extreme theoretical sophistication that suddenly turns into an affected banality. Nothing takes root in those regions, there is nothing that retains its consistency as soon as it is a question of talking about what happens in a *passee*. You are my witnesses. We can still be content if that which exists by virtue of the significations that one forms in regard to it, manages to make a hole in what one imagines of it.

‘The missed encounter’ – a light-hearted title in the style of Marivaux – such could be the aegis under which the device of the *passee* unfolds. This is manifested by the indirect testimony, but the miss, the failure, increases through the idea of the stakes involved: the analyst in his ‘personation’ (much more than in his person). By accepting that his *said (dit)* be ‘related’ (this is prescribed by the rule), the *passant* loses his lead and agrees, by doing so, to be heard through his reputation. This is a reputation restricted to a very small circuit, certainly, but it is a reputation nonetheless since it is dependent on a ‘they say’. Here he is reduced to what they speak of, a third person whose ‘personation’ remains ambiguous, slipping from neutral to non-neutral, from the *it* of it’s raining, to the *he* of he’s laughing.¹⁹ It is terrible and it is not nothing, just what comes to the place of the lack of origin of the speaking being, and all the more so in he or she who *proposes* him or herself – yes, that really is the word – in order to sustain the rule, the ‘fundamental’ rule, that destines him or her to a practice of language without any ascribable end, starting from a repetition of which only Kierkegaard knew how to speak: wiped clean of all resentment. Thus psychoanalysts remain without any documents through the lack of any birth certificate. The *passee* may be of service for us to not forget this.

Translated from French by Michael Plastow

Notes

¹ Psychoanalyst, practising in Paris, member of the *École Lacanienne de Psychanalyse*.

² He imported this word from English in which ‘analysand’ is the usual form, to designate he or she who ‘is in analysis’, or who pursues an analysis. In French, the past participle has a passive meaning which was no longer suitable for Lacan in so far as he distinguished between the one who is analysing (*analysand*) and the one who results from this process (*analysé*). Translator’s Note: the term that was used in French to designate the analysand prior to this was ‘analysé’ or *one who is analysed*.

³ The pressure that such a grammar exerts on the speaking beings who put it to work are felt all the more for having been broken in to such a degree that the speaker henceforth only rarely experiences their constraints. They then appear as if they were second nature, and it is only in

certain purist niceties that one is able to refind its original violence, which in good time justifies the intensity with which it is broken in.

⁴ Lacan, Jacques. "Acte de fondation". Preface of the first Annual of the *l'École Freudienne de Paris* in 1965. Accessible at : <http://www.ecole-lacanienne.net/pastoutlacan60.php>

⁵ Chauviré, Christiane. *Le moment anthropologique de Wittgenstein*. Paris: Kimé, 2004, 82.

⁶ "At the beginning of psychoanalysis is the transference. It is there thanks to he whom we shall call from the outset of these remarks: the psychoanalyst. We do not have to explain what conditions it. Here at least, it is there from the beginning". Jacques Lacan. *Proposition of 9th October 1967*.

⁷ T.N.: Literally 'naming'.

⁸ This title has become so canonical that one no longer hears that it is, and remains, a *proposition*.

⁹ Lacan, Jacques. *Proposition of 9th October 1967*.

¹⁰ In regard to this apparent contradiction, much can be gained by taking support from the notion of "inseparable accident", as it is presented by Alain de Libéra in: *La querelle des universaux*. Paris: Le Seuil, 1983: 359-362.

¹¹ T.N.: In French *instrumentaliser* takes on the meaning of 'to make use of', 'to exploit or manipulate'.

¹² Le Gaufey, Guy. "Le cible du transfert". *Littoral* 10, 1983 : 79-104.

¹³ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Remarques sur les fondements des mathématiques*. Paris: Gallimard, 1983, III, § 69. The "all" in question is of course those who are prepared to follow the rule.

¹⁴ This *pratique du tourbillon*, literally 'whirl practice', is a procedure invented in the *École Lacanienne de Psychanalyse* to invent a different jury for each of the different *passes* such that a jury does not listen to a number of *passes*, but rather one only, as a means of fighting against the 'professionalization' of such a jury.

¹⁵ Lacan, Jacques. *The four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis*. Lesson of 12 February 1964.

¹⁶ In other words in the first lines of Chapter 7 of *The Interpretation of Dreams*: Freud, Sigmund. "The Interpretation of Dreams". *Standard Edition* 4. London: Hogarth, 508f..

¹⁷ "ganz besonders durchsichtige". Sigmund Freud, *Traumdeutung. Studienausgabe in zehn Bänden*. Vol. II. Frankfurt/M: Fischer, 1989, 525. And: *Standard Edition* 4. London: Hogarth, 549.

¹⁸ Lacan, Jacques. *The four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis*. Tr. Alan Sheridan. New York/London: Norton, 59-60.

¹⁹ T.N.: Here the grammatically neutral (it) and masculine (he) pronouns, in the French are conveyed by the same pronoun: *il*.